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ABSTRACT
This paper extends the empirical analysis of the determinants of judicial
behavior by estimating the ideal points for the Justices of the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court from 1988-2009. Taiwan presents a particularly interesting
case because the establishment and development of constitutional review
corresponds to the country 's political transition from an authoritarian regime to an
emerging democracy. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political
coalitions in the Judicial Yuan based on presidential appointments. We did not find
any strong evidence of such coalitions. Our empirical results indicated that, with the
exception of a handful of Justices, most of them have moderate estimated ideal
points. In the context of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, our results also confirm
the previous econometric analysis that largely rejected the attitudinal hypothesis,
which predicted that Justices would respond to their appointers 'party interests.
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Judicial Ideal Points in New Democracies
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of comparative judicial politics, Taiwan is a particularly
interesting case because the establishment and development of its
constitutional review, to a large extent, corresponds to its transition from an
authoritarian regime to an emerging democracy.' Further, scholars have
identified Taiwan as a success story-Taiwanese constitutional judges have
increasingly established themselves as a relevant role, while simultaneously
avoiding excessive backlash from other political actors.2
The Taiwanese Constitution ("Constitution" or "ROC Constitution") is
one of the oldest active constitutions remaining in the world. Similarly, the
Taiwanese Constitutional Court (a.k.a. "Council of Grand Justices" or
"Council") predates almost all other specialized constitutional courts on the
globe. Although its composition and competence have been reformed in the
last fifty years, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court is by no means a new
product, as are the constitutional courts in many other third-wave
democracies,3 but it is instead an institution that has prevailed throughout
the authoritarian period and the more recent emerging democracy. The age
and role of the Council of Grand Justices substantially distinguish the court
from other, seemingly similar, constitutional courts around the world.
The Council was founded in China in 1948 and retreated with the ROC
government to Taiwan in 1949.4 Prior to 2003, the Council was composed
of seventeen Grand Justices who were appointed by the President and
approved by the Control Yuan (1948-1992) or the National Assembly
(1992-2000). The Grand Justices served renewable terms of nine years.'
The Presidents of the Judicial Yuan presided over the Council meetings,
6despite the fact that they were not Grand Justices at the time. Today, the
1. On other transitions, see generally GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS:
JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA (2004): LISA HILBINK. JUDGES BEYOND
POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM CHILE (2007); REBECCA BILL
CHAVEZ, THE RULE OF LAW IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES: JUDICIAL POLITICS IN ARGENTINA (2004).
2. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW N NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 42, 106 (2003).
3. For example, Spain, Portugal, Eastern European countries, or Chile (to some extent).
4. Yueh-sheng Weng, Wokuo Shihhsien chihtu chih Techen yu Chanwang [The Features and
Prospects of the Republic of China (ROC) Constitutional Review System], in SSUFAYUAN DAFAKUAN
SHIHHSIEN 50 CHOUNIEN CHI[NIEN LUNWENCHI [ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF THE FIFTIETH
ANNIVERSARY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS BY THE GRAND JUSTICES OF THE JUDICIAL
YUAN] 297 (Dep't of Clerks for the Justices of the Constitutional Court ed., 2000).
5. Ssufayuan Tsuchihfa [The Organic Act of the Judicial Yuan], art. 3 (1947) (amended 2009)
(Taiwan) [hereinafter OAJY], available at
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=AOO 10051; see also Constitution, (1947)
(Taiwan); J.Y. Interpretation No. 541 (2002) (Taiwan). available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/CON STlTUTIONALCOURT/en/pO3 01 .asp?expno 541.
6. See OAJY, supra note 5, arts. 3(l), 3(2), 5(2); see also Thomas Weishing 1-uang, Judicial
Activism in the Transitional Polity: The Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
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number of Grand Justices has been reduced to fifteen, and both the President
and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan simultaneously hold a position as
Grand Justice. With the exception of the eight Justices appointed in 2003 to
serve four-year terms, today's Justices are appointed by the President with
the majority consent of the Legislative Yuan and serve non-renewable
eight-year terms. 7 About half of the Justices are renewed every four years,
meaning, in theory, each President could potentially appoint seven or eight
Justices during his or her four-year presidential term.
The Council of Grand Justices follows the centralized German model of
constitutional review rather than the decentralized review system practiced
in the United States or Japan. 8  The importance of the Council and the
significant role that it plays in Taiwan provide an interesting framework to
evaluate and analyze the judicial behavior therein.
In a previous paper we tested the attitudinal model in the Council of
Grand Justices during the period 1988-2008. 9 We hypothesized that the
Taiwanese constitutional judges responded to party interests, either because
their preferences coincided with the appointer(s) or they wanted to exhibit
loyalty to them. Given the disproportional influence of the Chinese
Nationalist Party ("KMT" or "Kuomintang") in the appointment process
throughout most of this period, we expected the Grand Justices appointed by
KMT Presidents (in 1985, 1994, and 1999) to favor KMT interests. We also
expected that the Grand Justices appointed by the President-who was
supported by the Democratic Progressive Party ("DPP"), the major KMT
opponent-in 2003 and 2007 would disfavor KMT interests.' 0 Under this
L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
7. See Constitution, Additional Articles (1991) (amended 2000) (Taiwan): see also Constitution,
Additional Articles, art. 5 (1991) (amended 2005) (Taiwan). Moreover, it is noteworthy that the
Justices who serve as President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan are not guaranteed an
eight-year term in office. Constitution, Additional Articles, art. 5(2) (1991) (amended 2005) (Taiwan).
8. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 465-66 (2d
ed. 2006). The Council portrays itself as a "model similar to the German and Austrian system." See
also J.Y. Interpretation No. 419 (1996) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03 01.asp?expno 419.
9. See Nuno Garoupa, Veronica Grembi & Shirley Ching-ping Lin, Explaining Constitutional
Review in New Democracies: The Case of Taiwan, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 1 (2011). For a
general view of the attitudinal model, see Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Ideological Position as a
Variable in the Authoring of Dissenting Opinions on the Warren and Burger Courts, 16 AM. POL. RES.
317, 317-28 (1988); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 557, 557-65 (1989); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT,
THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1997); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); THOMAS G HANSFORD & JAMES E
SPRIGGS IT, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2008).
10. However, because the opposition never actually dominated the relevant confirming body (i.e.,
the Control Yuan, National Assembly, or Legislative Yuan), we expected the second effect (alignment
between the interests of the opposition and the voting patterns of Justices appointed by the DPP
President) to be less significant than the first (alignment between the interests of the KMT and the
voting patterns of Justices appointed by the KMT Presidents).
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hypothesis, the affiliation of the Grand Justices, as measured by the
President who appointed them, should be a good predictor of their voting
patterns in the Court.11
As mentioned earlier, the appointment mechanism is heavily dominated
by the President and the political parties of the relevant confirming body
(under the influence of the KMT and its allies). In this study, we assumed
that the choice of Grand Justices would correspond to the preferences of the
appointing President given the position of the Control Yuan, National
Assembly, or Legislative Yuan.' 2 Thus, we expected these preferences to
largely align. Moreover, the Grand Justices have limited tenure and, prior to
2003, also faced the possibility of reappointment. Thus, we also expected
that these two factors would influence the likelihood that the Grand Justices
would seriously consider the interests of their appointers.
Our research proved to be quite convincing-although political
variables partly explained how members of the Council made their decisions,
the role of political variables was significantly limited and did not evidence
notable party alignment. (Specifically, we tested how the Council members
aligned with the KMT, the traditional ruling party). Our empirical analysis
provides evidence that, in general, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court
remains fairly insulated from the main party interests. Also, our empirical
research did not find any strong systematic interference of any other political
variables or ideologies.
In addition, our results indicated that other explanations, such as judicial
concern over advancing the reputation of the Court, exist to describe the
Council's behavior. Moreover, since dissenting opinions had become more
likely as the KMT gradually lost its political influence, while the likelihood
of the opposition gaining the presidency increased (i.e., during the political
transition), our results showed that the alignment of interests between the
Council and political parties weakened during the transition (mid-1990s to
early 2000s) but was noticeably stronger prior to the transition period.
In this paper, we address judicial behavior in the Council with a
different empirical methodology. We estimate individual ideal points for
each constitutional judge during the period 1988-2009. The American
empirical literature on the behavior of the Supreme Court Justices developed
a sophisticated empirical method for estimating individual judges' ideal
points based on how judges manifest their views in dissenting and
I I. The following names are the elected Presidents of Taiwan since 1950: Chiang Kai-shek
(1950-1975, KMT), Yen Chia-kan (1975-1978, KMT), Chiang Ching-kuo (1978-1988, KMT), Lee
Teng-hui (1988-2000. KMIT). Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008, DPP), and Ma Ying-jeou (since 2008.
KMT).
12. While these bodies of government should not pose problems for KMT Presidents, they could
potentially influence in the case of DPP President Chen (who never controlled a legislative majority).
2012]
National Taiwan University Law Review
concurring opinions.13 Technically, the empirical method of estimation
revealed those points in some n-dimensional space of politically relevant
choices, which judges prefer over all other points in that space. Utilizing this
particular approach allows us to estimate judicial ideal points by ranking
them in one dimension. Essentially, we treated the period between
1988-2009 as a single large court, which based on how the Justices have
voted, we estimated their individual ideal points.
In the context of the U.S. Supreme Court, it has been shown that the
ideal points of individual Justices can be consistently estimated in a
one-dimension space that reflects the traditional conservative-liberal
dichotomy. Although results suggest that U.S. Supreme Court Justices do not
have temporally constant ideal points, they seem to correlate quite
significantly with the general perception of which Justices are conservative
or liberal. Therefore, ideal point estimations are still viewed as a rightful
measurement to predict judicial behavior.
Our paper develops a similar exercise for the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan.
The unique dataset is collected by the authors and includes 101 decisions
("interpretations") issued by the Taiwanese Constitutional Court during the
time period between 1988 and 2009. We chose July 15, 1987 (the date of the
lifting of martial law in Taiwan) to serve as the initial period because this
date corresponds with the start of the transition from the traditional
authoritarian period to an emerging democracy. Additionally, we chose those
interpretations in which petitioners with certain political interests can be
easily identifiable (particularly, when they are affiliated with the KMT and
its allies or with the opposition). 14 However, unlike the American model, the
Taiwanese Constitutional Court does not entertain concrete review, but
instead employs abstract review when it delivers a constitutional
interpretation. Therefore, all of the cases we have selected are abstract in
nature and can be easily associated with political interests. If there are
significant differences among judicial ideal points, these cases will present
13. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn. Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999. 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). Other
relevant references see Simon Jackman, Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Bayesian
Simulation: Identification, Estimation, Inference, and Model Checking, 9 POL. ANALYSIS 227 (2001);
Joseph Bafumi et al., Practical Issues in Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal Point
Estimation, 13 POL. ANALYSIS 171 (2005): Michael Peress, Small Chamber Ideal Point Estimation,
17 POL. ANALYSIS 276 (2009). From a comparative perspective, see also Matthew E. Wetstein et al.,
Ideological Consistency and Attitudinal Conflict: A Comparison of the US. and Canadian Supreme
Courts, 42 COMP. POL. STUD. 763 (2009); Chris Hanretty, Dissent in Iberia: The Ideal Points of
Justices on the Spanish and Portuguese Constitutional Tribunals, EUR. J. POL. RES. (forthcoming
2012).
14. By no means are these the only cases with possible political consequences. However, in order
to avoid subjectivity, we have only considered those cases that are obviously and remarkably political
in nature. The argument should be that these are salient cases for which we should be able to detect
politicization, if any exists.
[Vol. 7: 1
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the best evidence to reveal these points.
Unlike the standard results from research on the U.S. Supreme Court
the evidence from our Taiwan Constitutional Court study do not show
significantly different estimated ideal points. In fact, the Taiwanese
constitutional judges do not appear to be excessively polarized. Our results
indicate that the ranking of estimated ideal points is fairly unrelated to
presidential appointments. In addition, because part of our estimated results
reflects a prevailing low rate of separate opinions, Justices who tend to
author dissenting opinions more often are more likely polarized in terms of
estimated ideal points.
Our results generally support our previous findings. The Council is
largely non-polarized and seems to follow the pattern of civil law
jurisdictions by pursuing a certain apolitical fagade."5 While some political
influence can be detected empirically, it is generally insignificant once
compared with the U.S. Supreme Court.
Our paper makes four main contributions to the growing comparative
empirical studies on constitutional courts. First, it estimates judicial ideal
points outside the U.S. court system. Second, it compares the Council of
Grand Justices with other constitutional courts to confirm the Council's
distinct elements. Third, it supports the view that, under certain conditions,
constitutional judges in a particular setting might be willing to restrain their
potential ideological biases and pursue other, more collective, interests.
Fourth, it provides an empirically oriented framework for future research on
Taiwanese judicial politics. In Part ii we address the case of Taiwan. In Part
III, we present our empirical results. And, finally, in Part IV we conclude this
paper.
II. THE CASE OF TAIWAN
16
Prior to Taiwan's transformation to a democratic system in the 1990s,
the country experienced over 100 years of colonial and authoritarian rule.
1 7
In 1895, as a result of the First Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was ceded by
Imperial China (the Ching Dynasty) to Japan and became a Japanese colony
15. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PfREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (3d
ed. 2007) (discussing the pressure for consensus in the civil law tradition).
16. This section largely follows Garoupa, Grembi & Lin, supra note 9.
17. See Tay-sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a
Liberal and Democratic Country. 11 PAC. RIML. & POL'Y J. 531. 531-39 (2002); see also Xiaohong
Xiao-Planes, Of Constitutions and Constitutionalism: Trying to Build a New Political Order in China,
1908-1949, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA (Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle
eds., 2009) (discussing the Constitution as a political compromise and the later enactment of the
Temporary Provisions during the period of the Communist Rebellion). The Temporary Provisions
removed constitutional constraints imposed on the President and effectively allowed for a one-party
state with no independent constitutional structures.
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for fifty years until Japan was defeated during World War II in 1945.18 That
same year, the troops of Chiang Kai-shek, then-President of the Republic of
China and Director-General of the KMT as well as the Supreme Allied
Commander in Asia, took control of Taiwan on behalf of the Allied Forces.
Followed by Chiang's defeat in the Chinese Civil War, the KMT-led
government of the Republic of China declared martial law in Taiwan in May
1949. They also retreated from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan that year.
The KMT continuously ruled Taiwan, Penghu, and several outlying
Fujianese islands for fifty-five years19 until the DPP won the presidential
election in 2000.20 The KMT imposed authoritarian rule on the Taiwanese
people from 1949 until martial law was lifted in 1987. 21 This crucial
political reform opened up a new era of liberalization and democratization
22for Taiwan. Opposition parties were legalized in 1989, and many
restrictions on public discourse were eliminated.23 Beginning in 1991,
various general elections have been held regularly.24 Taiwan has been a
25liberal democratic state ever since .
The complex political transition from colonial rule to authoritarian reign
to democracy has inevitably affected Taiwan's laws and its overall legal
system. The Constitution of Taiwan, which is also the Constitution of the
18. See GoV'T 1NFO. OFF., REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEAR BOOK 53-54 (2010) [hereinafter 2010
Y.B.]. available at
http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/2010/03History.pdf.
19. See Cheng-jung Lin. The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Lack of Conclusions on
Taiwan s International Status, TAIWAN HIST. Ass'N (Sept. 10. 2001).
http://www.twhistory.org.tw/20010910.htm; see also Nigel Nien-Tsu Li, Nishuihsingchou de
Hsiancheng Taiwan Chiehyen Erhshih ien Huiku Hsianfa Laishihlu [The Constitution: March
Forward or Be Swept Away-The Post-Martial-Law Path 20 Years On], 46 SSU YU YEN: JENWEN YU
SHEHUIKEHSUEH TSACHIH [THOUGHT AND WORDS: J. HUMAN. & Soc. SCI.] 2008. at 1, 3.
20. See 2010 Y.B., supra note 18, at 56. The DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, was elected in 2000
and re-elected in 2004. However, the KMT returned to power after its candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, won
the presidential election in 2008 and re-elected in 2012.
21. See Wang, supra note 17, at 537-38. Parenthetically, Chiang Ching-Kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's
son, was the President at the time; see also Jane Kaufinan Winn & Tang-chi Yeh, Advocating
Democracy: The Role of Lawyers in Taiwan s Political Transformation, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
561 (1995) (discussing the role of lawyers in promoting democracy in Taiwan both in increasing the
autonomy of Judicial Yuan and in forming and shaping the DPP and pro-democracy social
movements).
22. Wang, supra note 17, at 538: see also Sean Cooney, Why Taiwan Is Not Hong Kong: A
Review of the PRC's "One Country Two Systems" Model for Reunification with Taiwan. 6 PAC. RIM L.
& POIY J. 497, 518 (1997); Lin, supra note 19, at 2-3.
23. However, the DPP was already founded in 1986. See Tom Ginsburg, Confucian
Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 763, 770 (2002).
24. For example, the first election for all Representatives of the National Assembly was held in
1991: the first election for all Legislators was held in 1992: and the first direct elections for President
and Vice President occurred in 1996, when KMT candidates Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan were elected
respectively. See 2010 Y.B., supra note 18.
25. See Wang, supra note 17, at 539; see also Cooney, supra note 22, at 518.
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Republic of China,2 6 is an excellent example of these changes. As originally
drafted, the central government, according to Sun Yat-sen's political
27doctrines, is separated into five branches ("Yuan")-the Executive,
Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control Yuans,
28 with the President 29
and the National Assemb30 separated outside of the five-power scheme.
Among them, the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Yuans reflect the
conventional Montesquieuan framework. 31 The Examination Yuan is in
charge of entry into the civil service and the Control Yuan is responsible for
auditing as well as impeachment of public officials. 2 Furthermore, the
Taiwanese government is divided into central, provincial or municipal, and
district levels.
33
In addition to Taiwan's relatively complicated political structure, the
legitimacy of its Constitution was challenged during the authoritarian
regime. First, the Constitution was imposed from the outside without the
consent or approval of the Taiwanese people. Secondly, the Taiwanese
government was dominated by the so-called "Mainlanders," who comprised
approximately 13% of the population,34 despite the fact that the native
Taiwanese people comprised the overwhelming majority (approximately
87%) of the population.35
Setting aside the controversial, but valid, claims made by the Taiwanese
people against their government, it is important to note that the Constitution
has never been completely enforced in the country for several reasons. To
begin with, the National Assembly enacted the "Temporary Provisions
26. The Constitution was enacted in 1946 and went into effect in 1947 in China. See GINSBURG,
supra note 2, at 111; Constitution (1947) (Taiwan).
27. See DENNY ROY, TAIWAN: APOLITICAL HISTORY 84 (2003).
28. Constitution, arts. 53-106 (1947) (Taiwan).
29. The President is the head of the state and serves a six-year term with a two-term limit.
Constitution, arts. 35, 47 (1947) (Taiwan). The President's promulgation of laws and orders requires
the countersignature of the head of the Executive Yuan (the Premier). Constitution, art. 37 (1947)
(Taiwan). Meanwhile, his or her appointment to the Premier requires the consent of the Legislative
Yuan. Constitution, art. 55(l) (1947) (Taiwan); see also Wang, supra note 17, at 54 1.
30. The National Assembly is a popularly elected body that is empowered to elect or recall the
President or Vice President and to amend the Constitution. Constitution. art. 27 (1947) (Taiwan) see
also Wang, supra note 17, at 54 1.
3 1. These three branches represent the state's highest administrative, legislative, and judicial
organs respectively. Constitution. arts. 53, 62. 77 (1947) (Taiwan): see also Ginsburg. supra note 23. at
768 n.8.
32. Constitution, arts. 83, 90 (1947) (Taiwan); see also Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 768.
33. Constitution, arts. 107-111, 112-128. Because the Constitution establishes an extremely
complex political structure, some have argued that the structure is more suitable for governing a huge
country, such as China, than a small island like Taiwan. See Cooney, supra note 22, at 514.
34. "Mainlanders" (Waishengjen, literally "people from other provinces") refers to people who
were born in China and emigrated from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan after 1945. See Wang, supra
note 17, at 535, 537; see also GINSBURc, supra note 2, at 108.
35. "Native Taiwanese" (Penshengren, literally "people of this province") refers to the people,
and their descendents, who inhabited Taiwan before 1945. See Wang, supra note 17, at 535.
2012]
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Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion" ("Temporary
Provisions") in China in 1948.36 The Temporary Provisions suspended many
37provisions of the Constitution while strengthening presidential powers
until their abolishment in 1991.38 Additionally, the Constitution has been
amended seven times since 1991. 39 Although these amendments, which are
known collectively as the "Additional Articles," preserve the original text of
the Constitution, they have significantly reshaped the structure of the
government and its political practices.4 The central government provides a
noteworthy example of how the Additional Articles have affected the
Constitution and its uniform implementation throughout Taiwan.
For example, the position of the President has been substantially
reorganized by the 1994 and 1997 Additional Articles, which allow for the
President's direct election by the Taiwanese people for a four-year term (that
may only be renewed once). Under the Additional Articles, the President is
no longer required to seek the Premier's countersignature to promulgate
personnel orders and is also permitted to appoint the Premier without the
consent of the Legislative Yuan. Moreover, the President, upon passing a
vote of "no confidence" against the Premier, has been granted the authority
to dissolve the Legislative Yuan.41 These changes to the Taiwanese central
government indicate that the country has adopted a semi-presidential system
since 1997.42
36. Tungyuan Kanluan Shihchi Linshih Tiaokuan [The Temporary Provisions Effective During
the Period of Communist Rebellion] (1948) (repealed 1991) (Taiwan) [hereinafter Temporary
Provisions], available at
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/TemporaryProvisionsEffectiveDuringthe Period of CommunistR
ebellion (non-official translation).
37. For example. the Temporary Provisions facilitated the President's ability to issue emergency
orders and empowered the President to create extra-constitutional agencies as well as suspended the
two-term limit on the presidency. See Temporary Provisions, arts. 1, 3, 4; see also Wang, supra note
17; Cooney, supra note 22, at 515; GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 113-15.
38. See Wang, supra note 17, at 542. Parenthetically, Lee Teng-hui, Chiang Ching-kuo's
successor, was President at the time.
39. The Constitution was revised in 1991, 1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 2005. However, the
Council of Grand Justices declared the 1999 Additional Articles unconstitutional and void because the
Amendments permitted Representatives of the National Assembly to extend their own terms for
almost three years. See Constitution, Additional Articles, (1991) (amended 2005) (Taiwan),
available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07 2.asplawno=98.
For a more detailed discussion, see Jiunn-rong Yeh, Constitutional Reform and Democratization in
Taiwan: 1945-2000, in Taiwan's Modernization in Global Perspective 47-77 (Peter Chow ed., 2002).
see also J.Y. Interpretation No. 499 (2000), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03 01.aspexpno=499.
40. See Cooney, supra note 22, at 520; see also Wang, supra note 17, at 542.
41. See Constitution, Additional Articles (1991) (amended 1994) (Taiwan), Constitution
Additional Articles (1991) (amended 1997) (Taiwan): see also Constitution, Additional Articles, arts.
2(1), 2(2), 2(6). 3(1). 3(2) (1991) (amended 2005) (Taiwan).
42. For a detailed discussion, see Thomas Weishing Huang, The President Refuses to Cohabit.
Semi-presidentialism in Taiwan, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL' Y J. 375, 375-402 (2006).
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However, unlike other semi-presidential countries, Taiwan has neither a
constitutional mechanism nor a provision that requires the President to take
into account the results of parliamentary elections when appointing a prime
43minister. The country also lacks a political culture of a legislature with a
strong sense of political identity, such as the French tradition,44 that would
urge the President to accept "cohabitation." ' 4 As a result, Taiwan
experienced a chronic political deadlock between the executive and
legislative branches when DPP President Chen Shui-bian refused to
cohabitate with the opposition coalition (referred to as the "Pan-Blue"
Alliance 46), which dominated the Legislative Yuan throughout his terms
(2000-2008).
41
Moreover, the 1992 and 2000 Additional Articles have considerably
altered the status of the Control Yuan by allowing the President, with the
consent of the Legislative Yuan, to elect its members. These Additional
Articles also allow the President to appoint the Grand Justices of the Judicial
Yuan and the Members of the Examination Yuan in the same manner.48 Even
more dramatically, the 2005 Additional Articles abolished the National
Assembly 49 and set a very high threshold for constitutional amendments. 50
As a result, the Constitution has since become extremely difficult to change.
Further, it is important to understand how the Additional Articles have
transformed the judicial branch of the Taiwanese government. Prior to the
Articles, the Constitution granted the Judicial Yuan, the highest judicial
organ, the authority to: (1) adjudicate civil, criminal, and administrative
cases, as well as cases concerning disciplinary measures against public
officials; 5' and (2) interpret the Constitution as well as unify the
43. Id. at 387.
44. The tradition of a strong legislature existed at least between the Third and Fourth Republics.
See id. at 386.
45. Id. at 385, 387.
46. This alliance was formed by the KMT and the People First Party ("PFP"). See Background
Note: Taiwan, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIA AND PAC. AFF.,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2012).
47. See Huang. supra note 42. at 386.
48. See Constitution, Additional Articles, arts. 5(1), 6(2). 7(1). 7(2) (1991) (amended 2005)
(Taiwan).
49. Id. art. 1.
50. Id. art. 12 ("Amendment of the Constitution shall be... passed by at least three-fourths of the
[legislators] present at a meeting attended by at least three-fourths of the total members of the
Legislative Yuan, and sanctioned by electors ... at a referendum ... wherein the number of valid votes
in favor exceeds one-half of the total number of electors .... ").
51. Constitution, art. 77 (1947) (Taiwan). However, in practice. these cases are adjudicated by the
ordinary court system, Administrative Courts, and Commission on the Disciplinary Sanction of
Functionaries, which are outside the Judicial Yuan but under its supervision. Because these practices
have made the Judicial Yuan "the highest judicial administrative organ," rather than the highest
judicial (adjudicative) organ. the related laws were declared unconstitutional in 2001. See J.Y.
Interpretation No. 530 (2001), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p 0 3 01 .asp?expno=530.
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interpretations of laws and ordinances. 52 However, the 1997 and 2005
Additional Articles have further expanded the power of the Judicial Yuan
53
by empowering the Grand Justices to adjudicate cases that related to the
impeachment of the President or Vice President as well as cases concerning
the dissolution of unconstitutional political parties.5 4 In order to safeguard
judicial independence, the 1997 Additional Articles have also prohibited the
Executive Yuan from eliminating or reducing the annual budget proposal of
the Judicial Yuan. 5
The Council of Grand Justices has the potential to play a significant role
in the governmental system. For example, the Council has the authority to
take action in the following scenarios by: (1) dealing with the "most
contentious moral and political issues," as its counterparts do in other
democracies; 56 (2) acting as an arbiter when a political deadlock occurs
between the executive and the legislature under the present semi-presidential
system;57 (3) interpreting the Constitution authoritatively, especially now
that it is immensely difficult to amend; and (4) deciding some of the most
politically controversial cases (e.g., impeaching the President or dissolving
an "unconstitutional" political party). Unsurprisingly, this authority has
become more of a coveted object for various political, economic, and
judicial actors than ever before. 58 Regardless of the heightened desirability
of the Council's Grand Justices positions, we cannot ignore that the Council
once operated as an instrument of the KMT regime, rather than a guardian of
the Constitution, during the authoritarian era.59 The most infamous example
was Interpretation No. 31 of 1954, when the Council allowed the Members
of the Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan, and National Assembly, who were
elected in China in 1948, to remain in power for more than forty years.60
52. Constitution, art. 78 (1947) (Taiwan). The power ofjudicial review lies with the Council of
Grand Justices, a component of the Judicial Yuan. See Wang, supra note 17, at 545; see also Ginsburg,
supra note 23, at 768.
53. See Huang. supra note 6. at 4.
54. See Constitution, Additional Articles, art. 5(4) (1991) (amended 2005) (Taiwan).
55. See Constitution, Additional Articles, art. 5(6) (1991) (amended 1997) (Taiwan).
56. See Ran Hirschl, Reviews (2002-2005), December 2003, Ginsburg, Tom, Book Review:
Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases by Tom Ginsburg, LAW&
POL. BOOK REV. (Dec., 2003) [hereinafter Hirschl, Book Review], available at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/Ginsburg I203.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
57. A good example is Interpretation No. 632. which was filed by the DPP legislators because the
Pan-Blue-dominated Legislative Yuan had refused to exercise its consent power over President Chen's
nominees of the Members of the Control Yuan for more than two and a half years. The Council finally
ruled the action of the legislature unconstitutional. J.Y. Interpretation No. 632 (2007), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourten/p03 01.asp?expno 632.
58. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 - 12 (2004).
59. See Wang. supra note 17. at 545: see also GINSBURG, supra note 2. at 130-34.
60. See Wang. supra note 17. at 543-44; see also J.Y. interpretation No. 31 (1954) (Taiwan)
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03 01.asp?expno=31. However, the
Council eventually overturned Interpretation No. 3 1. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 261 (1990) (Taiwan),
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Since the martial law was lifted in 1987, fifty-two Grand Justices have
served on the bench. Our research covers forty-nine of these Justices, 61 all
of whom were respectively appointed by President Chiang Ching-Kuo in
1985 (i.e., the fifth term), President Lee Teng-hui in 1994 and 1999 (i.e., the
sixth term), President Chen Shui-bian in 2003 and 2007, and President Ma
Ying-Jeou in 2008.6 2 Twenty-three of the forty-nine Justices were former
Supreme Court judges in the ordinary court system (OAJY art. 4(1)(1));
twenty-three were formerly law professors (OAJY art. 4(1)(3)); two were
senior prosecutors; and only one was a legislator (OAJY art. 4(1)(2)).63 In
addition, 80% and 40% of Chiang and Ma's appointees are Mainlanders or
their second generation. In contrast, 79% and 74% of Lee and Chen's
appointees are native Taiwanese. Evidently, Mainlander Presidents (i.e.,
mainly Chiang) exhibited a tendency to appoint Mainlanders, despite the fact
that Mainlanders only represented 13-15% of the Taiwanese population. To
the contrary, Taiwan's native-born Presidents (i.e., Lee and Chen) had a
tendency of appointing a greater number of native Taiwanese to the bench,
even though these appointments did not accurately reflect the population
ratio.
As mentioned above, the Grand Justices presently enjoy the following
powers to: (1) interpret the Constitution; (2) unify the interpretations of laws
and ordinances; (3) adjudicate cases relating to the impeachment of the
available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03 01.asp?expno 261.
61. We only have forty-nine Justices in our dataset for the following reasons: First. Fan
Shin-Shiang, a Chiang's appointee, had taken a sick leave beginning in July 1987 and eventually died
of liver cancer in November 1987. Considering that she did not attend any Council meetings while in
office, we decided not to include her in our dataset. See Hua-yuan Hsueh. Taiwan Lishih Tzutien
Chiuhua Fan Hsin-Hsiang [Dictionary of the Taiwan Historj-Nine Strokes Fan Hsin-Hsiang].
TAIWAN LISHIH TZUTIEN [DICTIONARY OF THE TAIWAN HIST.],
http://nrch.cca.gov.tw/ccahome/website/site20/contents/009/cca220003-ii-wpkbhisdictOO2006-0612-u.
xml (last visited Apr. 4. 2011). Second, Rai Hau-Min (the current president of the Judicial Yuan) and
Su Yeong-Chin (the current vice president of the Judicial Yuan), Ma's appointees, did not take up their
posts until October 2010. These two Justices rendered none of the decisions that we collected for our
dataset so we decided to exclude them as well. See Rai Promises to Win Back Public's Trust in
Judiciary. TAIPEI TIMES. Oct. 14, 2010, at 3. available at
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/10/14/2003485347.
62. See Former Justices, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. COURT JUD.YUAN,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/pO1 04.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2012); see also,
Justices, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. COURT-JUD. YUAN, available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01 _03.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
63. OAJY, art. 4. "To be eligible for appointment as a Justice of the Constitutional Court, a
candidate must: (1) have served as a Justice of the Supreme Court for more than ten years ... ; or (2)
have served as a Member of the Legislative Yuan for more than nine years ... ; or (3) have been a
[law] professor ... for more than ten years . . .; or (4) have served as a Justice of the International
Court, or have had authoritative works published in the fields of public or comparative law; or (5) be a
person highly reputed in the field of legal research and have political experience. The number of
Justices qualifying under any single qualification listed above shall not exceed one third of the total
number of Justices."
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President or the Vice President; and (4) declare the dissolution of
unconstitutional political parties. 64 The Constitutional Interpretation
Procedure Act of 1993 ("CIPA") applies different procedures to each set of
61powers. In short, the Council conducts an abstract review in the first two
categories of jurisdiction and forms a Constitutional Court to hear the other
66two types of "cases or controversies" (i.e., to exercise concrete review).
Although the Council has not yet dealt with any cases to impeach the
President or Vice President or been required to dissolve an unconstitutional
party (and taking into consideration that interpreting the Constitution is the
core of constitutional review), our research thus concentrates on the Justices'
67
rulings under Article 5 of the CIPA, especially cases filed under Articles
5(1)(1) and 5(1)(3) (the petitioners in these cases are comprised of either the
central government, local governments, or at least one-third of legislators).
We also focused our research on a few other important cases that are related
to party politics and were filed under Articles 5(1)(2) and 5(2) (the
petitioners in these cases are comprised of individuals, legal persons,
political parties, or judges of the other courts68). 69
The CIPA grants an individual or a judge of the other courts standing to
64. See Constitution, arts. 78-79 (1947) (Taiwan); Constitution, Additional Articles, art. 5 (1991)
(amended 2005) (Taiwan).
65. See Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act (1948) (amended 1993) (Taiwan) [hereinafter
CIPA]. available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourten/p07 2.asp?lawno 73.
66. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 468.
67. Article 5(1) of CIPA provides
A petition for an interpretation of the Constitution may be filed under one of the following
circumstances: (1) Where a central or local government agency is uncertain regarding the
application of the Constitution in exercising its powers, or, where the agency, while
exercising its powers, is in dispute with another agency regarding the application of the
Constitution, or where the agency is uncertain of the constitutionality of a particular law or
order when applying it; (2) Where an individual, a legal person, or a political party, having
exhausted all judicial remedies provided by law, alleges that her/his/its constitutional rights
have been infringed upon and thereby questions the constitutionality of the law or order
applied by the court of last resort in its final decision; (3) Where the members of the
Legislative Yuan, in exercising their powers, are uncertain regarding the application of the
Constitution or regarding the constitutionality of a particular law when applying the same.
and at least one-third of the members of the Legislative Yuan have filed a petition.
Besides, since Interpretation No. 371 expanded the application of art. 5(2), now when any judge
sincerely believes the statute or regulation at issue before the court is in conflict with the Constitution,
the court has the authority to adjourn the proceedings and petition the Constitutional Court to interpret
the constitutionality of the statute or regulation at issue. J.Y. Interpretation No. 371 (1995) (Taiwan)
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03 01.asp?expno=371. Additionally,
unlike the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Grand Justices have no discretion when determining
which cases they would like to hear. In other words, the Grand Justices have to deal with all of the
petitions unless a petition does not meet the requirements of CIPA and, in that case, the Council should
dismiss the case without issuing any interpretation.
68. They include the ordinary court system, Administrative Courts, and Commission on the
Disciplinary Sanction of Functionaries. See supra notes 51 & 66 and accompanying text.
69. Out of 101 decisions in our dataset, 10 were filed under Article 5(l)(2) and I under Article
5(2); hence, the remaining ninety decisions were filed under Articles 5(1)(1 ) and 5(1)(3).
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file a petition for a constitutional interpretation under Articles 5(1)(2) or
5(2). However, the Council's constitutional interpretations are not equivalent
to the concrete review used by the American and Japanese Supreme Court
Systems because the Council does not have the authority to directly declare
another court's final decision unconstitutional. 7° Instead, the Council is
permitted only to interpret the constitutionality of the laws, regulations, or
legal precedents on which another court's decision was based. 71
Furthermore, although our research mainly focuses on those cases filed
under Articles 5(1)(1) and 5(1)(3) of the CIPA on account of their political
nature and significance, the cases filed by individuals (i.e., the cases of
72Article 5(1)(2) comprise a large portion of the Council's docket.
The Council must obtain an absolute majority of votes in order to
declare a constitutional interpretation. Prior to 1993, the Council had the
authority to adopt an interpretation with a three-fourths majority of the
attending Justices as long as it had a quorum consisting of three-fourths of
all the Justices. 73 However, in 1993, the CIPA was amended to require the
Counsel to obtain a two-thirds majority of attending Justices with a quorum
consisting of two-thirds of all Justices in order to adopt an interpretation.74
Additionally, prior to the changes imposed in 1993, any Justices with
separate opinions were only permitted to issue "dissenting opinions," even if
70. In addition to this difference, there are other distinctions between the Council and the
Supreme Courts of the United States and Japan. For example, the President, the other four Yuans. or
even one-third of legislators have the right to challenge, on an "abstract" basis, the constitutionality of
laws enacted by the Legislative Yuan. In this case, many of the "cases or controversies" doctrines that
form an important part of the U.S. constitutional jurisprudence cannot be applied naturally. However,
the role and profile of the Council seems to be consistent with general trends in East Asia. See
Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of East Asian Constitutionalism: Features in
Comparison, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 805 (2011).
71. See CIPA. art. 4; see also J.Y. Interpretation, No. 154 (1978) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourten/p03 Ol.asp?expno 154; J.Y. Interpretation, No. 271
(1990) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p 0 3 _01 .asp?expno=271; J.Y Interpretation, No. 374
(1995) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourten/p03 Ol.asp?expno 374; J.Y. Interpretation, No. 569
(2003) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03 01.asp?expno 569; J.Y. Interpretation, No. 582.
(2004) (Taiwan). available athttp://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/pO3 Ol.asp?expno 582.
72. For example, in the fifth and sixth terms, 97% and 92% of petitions respectively were filed by
individuals. In addition, 72% and 75% of interpretations, based on the cases filed by individuals,
received judicial rulings. See Judicial Yuan, Tiyichieh chih Tiliuchieh Tafakuan Chiu
Chikuanshengchingche yu Jenminshengchingehe Tsocheng Chiehshih chih Iungchishuchupiao [The
Proportion of the Cases Filed by Individuals and by Institutions fom the First Term to the Sixth term
of the Grand Justices], TUNGCHI TzULIAO [STAT.],
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourtluploadfile/E100/. -- J4 . ,
S -'P.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
73. See Ssufayuan Tafakuan Huiyi Fa [The Act of the Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial
Yuan], art. 13(1) (1948) (amended 1958) available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p07 2 one.asp?lawno=61&types=all.
74. See CTPA, art. 14(l).
2012]
National Taiwan University Law Review
their opinions differed only in the reasoning, but not the final ruling, from
the majority opinion. 75 Thus, the changes implemented under the 1993 CIPA
have allowed any Justices with separate opinions to issue either concurring
or dissenting opinions, which are proclaimed along with the interpretations
of the Council.
76
Under the Constitution, the Council has the power to declare laws and
ordinances unconstitutional and void. However, like other German-style
constitutional courts, the Council does not always act to explicitly declare a
law or governmental action unconstitutional or immediately invalid even
when it is not in conformity with the Constitution. 78 For example, in
Interpretation No. 419 of 1996, although the Council did not proclaim that
the status of the Vice President concurrently serving as Premier of the
Executive Yuan unconstitutional, it instead concluded that this situation was
"constitutionally inappropriate. 79 In addition, in Interpretation No. 530 of
2001, the Council struck down the related laws, which included the OAJY,
the Organic Act of Court, and the Organic Act of the Administrative Court,
but rather than immediately voiding them, the Council granted the
Legislative Yuan two years to revise the laws.80
These two examples prove the Council's tendency to adopt a cautious
and self-restricted role when making decisions that directly affect other
branches of the government or important political actors. In return, the
government and political parties in Taiwan generally respect the Council's
decisions. A successful example of the Council's cautious decision-making
tactics occurred with Interpretation No. 419. After this interpretation was
released, Vice President Lien Chan resigned from his post as the Premier
even though the Council did not explicitly prohibit the Vice President from
simultaneously serving as the Premier. On the other hand, the Council's
rulings are not respected absolutely. For instance, although the Council
issued Interpretation No. 530, which demanded the Legislative Yuan to
amend the unconstitutional laws within a two-year time frame, ten years
75. See ACGJ, art. 17.
76. See CIPA, art. 17. However, it is important to note that the Justices vote in secret. Therefore,
if a Justice votes with the minority, but he or she refuses to write a separate (especially dissenting)
opinion, then, according to the public record, that vote will be counted toward the majority. When this
occurs, it is possible to assume that the Justice voting with the minority opinion may have later
changed his or her opinion to align with that of the majority. However, it is more likely that, prior to
voting, the lobbyists of different political parties or interest groups have targeted the Justice, and, as a
result of these lobbying efforts, the Justices do not want to publish an individual opinion.
77. See Constitution, arts. 171-172 (1947) (Taiwan).
78. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 419 (1996) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p 0 3 01.asp?expno=419. See also J.Y. Interpretation
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have passed without legislative action.
I1. THE DATA AND RESULTS
We have analyzed and coded 101 decisions issued by the Grand Justices
of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court from 1988 to 2009.81 As discussed
earlier, we included all cases that are political in nature. These decisions
have obvious political content and, therefore, do not require second-guessing
concerning the political interests involved. These decisions include all cases
of abstract interpretations (filed under articles 5(1)(1) and 5(1)(3) of the
CIPA) and some cases of concrete interpretations (filed under articles 5(1)(2)
and 5(2) of the CIPA) issued during the relevant time period.8 2
When coding the decisions, we focused on the peculiarities of the
Taiwanese system of concurring and dissenting opinions (also known as
separate opinions). We also ensured that the different political interests were
accurately identified. 83 Furthermore, we studied a total of 49 Grand
Justices. s4 Table I provides the general descriptive statistics concerning
gender, first-time appointment/reappointment, career backgrounds, and
origins (meaning Mainlander or Native Taiwanese) of these forty-nine
Justices.
We began our study by conducting a descriptive analysis of dissent rates
(which we defined as the number of decisions with dissents over the total
number of decision) in the Council for each term in order to get a sense of
any judicial polarization that was employed. While almost two-thirds of the
decisions selected for our sample were decided unanimously (including
separate opinions that do not disagree with the Council's decision), slightly
more than one-third of the decisions included dissenting votes, which are
separate opinions that disagree with the outcome derived from the majority
opinion.8 5 During the early period of Taiwan's transition to democracy
(1988-1994) the dissent rate was less than 30%, but the rate increased to
50% in the following decade (1995-2003). However, once democracy began
to root itself (2004-2009), the dissent rate declined to approximately 28%.
Table ii provides additional details and explanations for dissent rate
81. Our previous work included ninety-seven decisions issued by the Grand Justices. See
Garoupa. Grembi & Lin, supra note 9. The list of cases is detailed in Appendix B.
82. See supra text accompanying note 69.
83. Appendix C provides a detailed explanation of the coding of controversial cases, which we
defined as those that required a more comprehensive explanation concerning the identification of
"concurring" and "dissenting" opinions. See supra text accompanying note 76. Our sample likely
underestimates actual dissent so, in this sense, we have only studied the reported dissent.
84. See supra text accompanying note 61. A list with their names in English and in Chinese is
reported on Appendix A.
85. Notice our functionalist definition of "dissent": an opinion that proposes a different outcome
in terms of pro-petitioner or against-petitioner.
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fluctuations.
After completing our dissent rate analysis, we focused on the next step
in our study-estimating judicial ideal points in the context of our sample.
We followed the methodological approach of previous scholarship, which is
86based on item response modeling (IRT). We let x 1 represent the vote of
each justice j (" = 1, . . . , J) for decision i (i = 1, . . . , N). Further, we
assigned a vote in favor of the constitutionality of a particular law,
ordinance, or government behavior a value of one (x1 = 1), while the votes
against constitutionality received a value of zero (x1 = 0). In our study, J=49
represents the number of respondents and N=101 represents the number of
items.
Each Justice's vote responds to the personal attributes of the judge as
well as the characteristics of the decision. In particular, we focused on the
judge's ideal point (0), which is a latent variable that can be measured
indirectly by observing the judge's manifest opinions on several decisions of
the Constitutional Court. We also considered a possible case characteristic
that adjusts the particular preference of an individual judge to the relevant
dimension when faced with a particular decision (83,). In other words, &3,
which is parallel to the discrimination parameter in IRT models, provides
information on how effectively a decision on a given issue can discriminate
between judges on the recovered dimension. We also accounted for a
particular location of the decision in the relevant space (a). Again, ai is
parallel to the difficulty parameter in Two-Parameter IRT models.
Suppose that the excess utility to a given justice, j, voting for
constitutionality in a particular decision, i, is the following:
ziy= oci + fiq + ej
where the error term e~j is distributed according to a standard normal
distribution. Since z1 is a latent variable, we assumed that xy = 1 if z,>0 and
x,, = 0 if z&<O.
Moreover, the model is not identified unless additional restrictions are
imposed. In the event that additional restrictions are imposed, it is possible
to either normalize the ideal points or constrain the position of two of the
Justices in the one-dimensional latent space in such a way that all of the
other Justices' ideal points are estimated in relation to the two fixed
positions.8 7 We chose to employ the latter empirical strategy and assumed
86. Martin & Quinn, supra note 13; Hanretty, supra note 13. Other papers that use non-dynamic
simulations include: Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman & Douglas Rivers. The Statistical Analysis of
Roll CallData, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 355 (2004): Jackman, supra note 13.
87. Normalized estimates typically show better convergence properties compared to
non-normalized ones. See Bafumi et al., supra note 13. However, here we use the standard procedure
[Vol. 7: 1
Judicial Ideal Points in New Democracies
standard normal priors for the item parameters.
The estimated judicial ideal points are presented in one relevant
dimension. These estimations typically follow the left-right or
liberal-conservative dimension. But, in the context of Taiwan, such
traditional dimension seems inapplicable considering the political culture of
the Council. The obvious approach may be favorable-unfavorable to the
KMT, given the political context and the transition period included in our
dataset. However, considering the potential complications caused by the
internal problems of the KMT during President Lee's terms, we decided to
loop together non-KMT's interests and suggested the relevant dimension to
be the KMT's political interests versus the political interests of non-KMT88
groups.
Through a careful analysis of the dissenting opinions, we began utilizing
this method by setting Yang Chien-hua and Li Chih-peng, both appointed by
President Chiang, to -2 (opinions favorable to non-KMT groups) and +2
(opinions favorable to KMT party), respectively. If the relevant dimension is
correctly identified, we expect these Justices to be at the extremes, while the
values corresponding to the other Justices should fall between -2 and +2. If,
however, we incorrectly identified the relevant dimension, the estimated
model should experience convergence problems or Justices are situated in
less likely positions.8 9 In order to address these shortcomings, in addition to
the complications in framing Taiwanese judicial politics in the recovered
dimension, we have estimated ideal points with multiple combinations of
Justices in -2 and +2, using those that the algorithm systematically locates in
the extreme positions. As a result, we therefore produced nine estimations of
ideal points to guarantee robustness and avoid the standard methodological
shortcomings of misidentifying the relevant dimension.
Given our dataset, we have a matrix of 49 Justices by 101 decisions with
a total of 1,415 observations. Since we estimated judicial ideal points over a
time period of more than twenty years, many individual votes in these
decisions are missing (because not all 49 Justices voted in all of the
decisions we used) and many pairs of Justices were never matched (because
they did not decide any cases together). Equivalently, we estimated ideal
points for a Council composed of 49 Justices where many were absent for a
significant number of decisions. 90 Since President Ma's appointees were
followed in the literature since convergence does not appear to be a relevant problem in our estimates.
88. See Garoupa, Grembi & Lin. supra note 9. at 34-35.
89. In our case standard diagnostic tests suggest that convergence is achieved in all simulations
except in the few cases when Justices appointed by President Ma are involved. This occurred because
of the relatively low number of decisions involving these Justices.
90. Missing data due to nonresponse threatens statistical inferences if the target of inference and
the tendency to omit responses are not independent, such as for instance when measuring students'
proficiency scores. In our case, instead, missing votes can be ignored in a statistical sense, and are due
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only included for a handful of decisions (four), we produced separate
estimations of judicial ideal points that include and exclude these Justices.
We used the MCMC pack for R to estimate the model.91 This approach
is advantageous because it uses Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo to
provide for robust intervals for the estimated parameters. Each model was
run for 1,200,000 iterations, discarding the first 2,000 as burn-in. The
thinning interval that we used in the simulations is 10. Gibbs sampling was
adopted.
The results of our nine estimations are presented in Tables III and IV as
average estimated ideal points conditioned on presidential appointments,
including and excluding President Ma's appointees, respectively. 92
Evidently, there is no correlation between the average estimated ideal points
and presidential appointments. 93 Examples of individual simulations in
terms of estimated ideal points and corresponding confidence intervals are
presented in Figures I and ii.
Tables V and VI present the individual average ideal estimate points for
44 Justices (excluding President Ma's appointees) and all 49 Justices
(including President Ma's appointees). The appropriate graphs are presented
in Figures III and IV. By ranking Justices from -2 to +2, the results clearly
confirm no relationship between the opinions of the Grand Justices and
presidential appointments. In addition, with the exception of six Justices, the
large majority seemingly favor a moderate ideal point. Furthermore, the
direct comparison of scores, including and excluding priors from the
computation, show that the six Justices in the extremes are robust to different
alternatives. JusticesShih Wen-sen, Dong Shiang-fei, and Yang Chien-hua
are close to -2 (favorable to non-KMT groups in the recovered dimension)
to playing no role in the assessing judges' alignment. See NORMAN ROSE, MATTHIAS VON DAVIER &
XUELI XU, MODELING NONIGNORABLE MISSING DATA WITH ITEM RESPONSE THEORY (TRT), 10-11
(2010). available at http://www.ets.org/Media/Research/pdf/RR-10-11 .pdf
91. See MCMCPACK: MARKOV CHAIN MONTE CARLO (MCMC) PACKAGE (2005),
http://mcmcpack.wustl.edu/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
92. The detailed results of the nine estimations in terms of individual estimated ideal points and
standard deviations are available upon request.
93. Correlation coefficients between estimated ideal points and the President who appointed the
judge are not statistically significant. We also computed correlation coefficients between estimated
ideal points and other potentially relevant variables (gender, whether justice is a mainlander, a
second-generation mainlander, a career judge, a law professor, and has been reappointed) in order to
check whether there may be other elements interfering with our interpretation of the recovered
dimension. We obtained one significant negative coefficient (-0.25) between average ideal points and
the professional origin of judges being a law professor (i.e. law professors are more likely to be
associated to negative ideal points). However, the coefficient turns to be non-significant once judges
appointed by President Ma are included in the computation of average points. Furthermore,
considering the absolute value of ideal points helps understanding whether there are other
characteristics pushing judges towards a greater degree of polarization, regardless the recovered
dimension. We find that more polarized justices are mainlanders, and have been appointed by
President Chiang, while less polarized ones have been appointed by President Chen.
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and Sun Sen-yan, Li Chung-sheng, and Li Chih-peng are close to +2
(favorable to KMT in the recovered dimension).
Table VII summarizes relevant information concerning the six Justices
we have identified in the extremes. There are no strong common attributes or
traits, except that they dissent more than the average Justices that we studied.
Unlike the results gathered from the U.S. Supreme Court Justices studies, the
judicial opinions of the Taiwanese Grand Justices do not lend themselves to
an easily detectable pattern that serves as an explanation for polarization.
Our results highlight the importance of dissenting opinions. Apart from
the six more polarized Justices, the next three Justices who have dissented
most often tended to have "off-center" opinions that were not statistically
significant. The three "off-center" Justices are: Liu Tieh-cheng (wrote five,
which was the highest number, of the dissenting opinions in our dataset), Su
Chun-shiung (wrote three dissenting opinions) and Shu Yu-shiu (wrote three
dissenting opinions) even though Justice Shu's ideal point is surprisingly
closer to center than those of the other two. Since not all of the dissenters are
on the margins, this reinforces the importance of our analysis and
emphasizes that these six polarized Justices are statistically different.
Our results also indicate that the Justices appointed after 2000, the year
of the first democratic alternation of ruling parties in Taiwan, seem to issue
more moderate opinions than the Justices before them. This conclusion is
evidenced by the incidence of dissent rates in the period 1995-2003, as
documented by Table Ii. Moreover, although our dataset shows that three of
the four new decisions in 2009 include dissenting votes, we believe this to
minimally affect the overall results for reasons already explained. Therefore,
we concluded that, unlike some of their predecessors, Justices appointed
after the first democratic alternation of ruling parties tended to issue
seemingly more politically moderate, or less polarized, opinions. This
observation is potentially in contradiction with the perceived reduction of the
individual cost of dissenting after 2000 (given the more democratic nature of
the political regime), but fully explained by our account elsewhere. 94
There are three potential objections to using the recovered dimension for
our analysis that we would like to address. The first argument against our
analysis is that a political dimension is irrelevant for judicial
decision-making in Taiwan. However, we found that the robustness and
convergence of results seem to indicate otherwise, even in the case that in
some specifications convergence is difficult to achieve given the limitations
of the dataset where the number of dissenting opinions only constitutes
one-third of the sample. We do not find this surprising since our dataset
reflects the politically salient cases rather than the entire workload of the
94. See Garoupa, Grembi & Lin, supra note 9.
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Council.
A related objection could be that our estimations are fundamentally
driven by dissent in these politically salient cases whereas in the more
general workload of the Council dissent patterns are significantly different.
However, there has been no systematic work on explaining general dissent
patterns at the Council, making it difficult to assess the extent to which
politically salient cases are exceptional in this respect. Moreover, the
direction of such alleged differences is simply unclear. That is, one could
argue that there will be more dissents in politically salient cases since the
appointers and their administration's interests are highly implicated.
Nonetheless, we could equally argue that there will be less dissents in
politically salient cases because, under these circumstances, Justices are
more likely to compromise or even consent in order to face less additional
pressure from outsiders. At the same time, in other less politically visible and
controversial cases (such as human rights), Justices could more freely
express their divisions within the Council. Compared with these seemingly
plausible, but contradictory, arguments, using politically relevant cases is
advantageous in order to nail down the interpretation of the recovered
dimension, which is not convoluted with potentially inconsistent
explanations.9 5
The second argument against our analysis is that the Council of Grand
Justices is characterized by n-relevant dimension and the recovered
dimension does not fully reflect ideal points in this Court. Although the
dataset cannot completely exclude the existence of other relevant
(unrecovered) dimensions, we believe that the robustness of our
results-absolutely clear evidence of no relationship between presidential
appointments and the systematic empirical identification of the same few
polarized Justices' points-evidences otherwise. Finally, we recognize that it
is certainly possible that the estimation of the moderate ideal points may not
be statistically strong, especially considering that some Justices are subject
to significantly larger standard deviations. However, our results indicate that
the six polarized Justices survive the difference in specifications.
The third argument is that our results do not reflect conventional
wisdom concerning some particular Justices. For example, Justice Shu
Yu-shiu emerges in our analysis as a moderate judge while many local legal
experts have recognized her work at the Court as promoting a particularly
outspoken line. Without questioning these general perceptions, our results
are driven by the dataset and therefore limited to politically salient cases. It
goes without saying that the area of human rights is of fundamental political
95. On the general discussion about political relevant cases, see Wen-Chen Chang. Strategic
Judicial Responses in Politically Charged Cases: East Asian Experiences, 8 INT'L. J. CONST. L. 885
(2011).
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importance, but it is not politically salient in our sense unless there is a clear
implication for the interests of the KMT (favorable or unfavorable). The
Justices are ranked in this light rather than by their general tendency to
dissent or to promote a particular unconventional approach to a particular
area of law. While recognizing the limitations of our dataset, the serious
advantage is a clean and transparent interpretation of the results.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an application of ideal point estimation to the
Taiwanese Constitutional Court. Unlike the published literature discussing
the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, we did not find a strong indication of
any relationship between judicial ideal points and presidential appointments.
Our results did not confirm any indication of political allegiance by Council
members.
Our estimated model is consistent with an interpretation we have offered
and defended in a previous article.96 While politics certainly influence the
Taiwanese Constitutional Court, it is not in the conventional
government-opposition or left-right dimensions. First, during Taiwan's
political transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, the Council
of Grand Justices had to liberate itself from the KMT tutelage and establish a
solid reputation for judicial independence. As a result, Grand Justices
appointed by KMT Presidents were willing to disregard, and even disfavor,
KMT interests when necessary. Second, the appointment process and other
features of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court do not generate the kind of
party quotas or majority-versus-minority coalitions seen in similar courts of
other countries. Third, the rate of dissenting opinions is low as compared
with those published by the U.S. Supreme Court.97 Thus, we conclude from
our studies that the Council has been primarily concerned with actively
asserting its independence from the other branches of government by
establishing consensus and sound legal doctrines.
The absence of polarization is not necessarily synonymous with a
consensual model. It could merely reflect lack of judicial independence.
However, the fluctuation of dissent rates and the consistency of our results
seem to make such explanation less plausible.
96. See Garoupa, Grembi & Lin. supra note 9.
97. It is important to note that, unlike the manner in which the U.S. Supreme Court disposes of
cases, an absolute majority (two-thirds or even three-fourths of the votes) is required for the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court to render a decision.
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Characteristics
1985-2008



















































Female 0 1 3 0
Male 15 18 16 5
Source: Taiwanese Constitutional Court, 1985-2009
Note: Some judges are counted more than once because they were appointed and reappointed
by different Presidents.
(*) Two were originally appointed by Yen Chia-kan (1976) and one by Chiang Kai-shek
(1972).
TABLE 1I Dissent in the Court By YearsNumber of Number of
Decisions Decisions With Percentage of
Without DissenDissent
Dissent
1988-1994 22 9 29.0%
1995-2003 19 19 50.0%
2004-2009 23 9 28.1%
Total 64 37 36.6%
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TABLE III Average Scores Excluding President Ma' appointees
Average score Average Average score
score
-2 +2 peint Ce appointed by appointed by
President Chen President Lee President Chiang
Shih, Sun, Sen-yan
Wen-sen 0.036 -0.074 -0.009
(Lee) (Lee)
Shih, Li,
Wen-sen Chung-sheng 0.032 -0.155 -0.019
(Lee) (Chiang)
Shih, Li






Shiang-fei Chung-sheng 0.028 0.061 0.005
(Lee) (Chiang)
Dong, Li
Shiang-fei Chih-Peng 0.030 0.053 -0.094
(Lee) (Chiang)
Yang, Sun, Sen-yan
Chien-hua (Lee 0.050 -0.025 0.140
(Chiang) (Lee)
Yang, Li,
Chien-hua Chung-sheng 0.046 0.015 0.129
(Chiang) (Chiang)
Yang, Li
Chien-hua Chih-Peng 0.031 0.010 0.029
(Chiang) (Chiang)
Note: Average scores exclude priors
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TABLE IV Average Scores Including President Ma' appointees
Average Average Average Average
score score score score
-2 +2 appointed appointed appointed appointed
by by by by
President President President President
Ma Chen Lee Chiang
Shih, Sun, Sen-yan
Wen-sen (Lee 0.158 -0.007 -0.087 -0.007
(Lee) (Lee)
Shih, Li,
Wen-sen Chung-sheng 0.091 0.000 -0.059 -0.009
(Lee) (Chiang)
Shih, Li
Wen-sen Chih-Peng 0.083 -0.001 -0.066 -0.110
(Lee) (Chiang)
Dong, Sun, Sen-yan
Shiang-fei (Lee) 0.082 0.024 0.003 0.015
(Lee)
Dong, Li,
Shiang-fei Chung-sheng 0.074 0.018 0.050 0.002
(Lee) (Chiang)
Dong, Li
Shiang-fei Chih-Peng 0.093 0.003 0.0039 -0.094
(Lee) (Chiang)
Yang,
Chien-hua Sun, Sen-yan 0.100 0.026 -0.047 0.139
(Chiang) (Lee)
Yang, Li,
Chien-hua Chung-sheng -0.011 -0.024 -0.067 0.162
(Chiang) (Chiang)
Yang, Li
Chien-hua Chih-Peng 0.009 0.037 -0.018 0.030
(Chiang) (Chiang)
Note: Average scores exclude priors
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TABLE V Individual Average Scoring Excluding Appointees of
President Ma
































Tsai, Ching- u(a)  0.262
Li, His-yao(ab 0.266
Lin, Yung-mou(b) 0.274
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TABLE VI Individual Average Scoring Including Appointees of
President Ma
Justices Averages with priors Averages without priors
Yang, Chien-huac) -1.739 -1.609
Dong, Shiang-fei(b) -1.548 -1.323
Shih, Wen-sen(b) -1.267 -0.900
Liu, Tieh-chengC) -0.877 -0.877
Tseng, Hua-sung(b) -0.497 -0.497
Huang, Yui-chin(b) -0.263 -0.263
Chen, Jui-tang(cO -0.220 -0.220
Chen, Chi-nan(b) -0.209 -0.209
Cheng, Chung-mou(b) -0.193 -0.193
Tseng, Yu-tien(a) -0.155 -0.155
Shu, Yu-shiu(a) -0.146 -0.146
Chang, Cheng-tao(c) -0.143 -0.143
Shu, Tsung-li-a -0.120 -0.120
Li, Chen-shan(a) -0.119 -0.119
Yang, Jih-jan( ') -0.106 -0.106
Ma, Han-bau(c) -0.106 -0.106
Zhai, Shao-shien(c) -0.104 -0.104
Wung, Yueh-sheng(c) -0.100 -0.100
Lin, Guo-shien(b) -0.067 -0.067
Lin, Tze-yi(a) -0.060 -0.060
Shih, His-en(c) -0.058 -0.058
Cheng, Chien-tsai(') -0.058 -0.058
Wu, Geng(c) -0.044 -0.044
Yang, Hui-ying(b) -0.040 -0.040
Wang, Tse-chien(b) -0.040 -0.040
Liao, Yi-nan(a) -0.017 -0.017
Wang, He-shiung(b) 0.021 0.021
Chen, Xin-min(d-  0.022 0.022
Shu, Bi-hu(a) 0.047 0.047
Peng, Feng-chih() 0.074 0.074
Huang, Mao-rong(d) 0.081 0.081
Ye, Bai-xiu(d) 0.089 0.089
Li, His-yao(a) 0.090 0.090
Chen, Chun-sheng(d) 0.092 0.092
Chih, Chi-ming(a) 0.092 0.092
Chen, Min(d) 0.093 0.093
Tsai, Ching-yu(a) 0.096 0.096
Lai, Ying-jao(b) 0.114 0.114
Yu, Shueh-ming(a) 0.159 0.159
Yang, Jen-shou(a)  0.168 0.168
Lin, Yung-mou(b) 0.239 0.239
Shieh, Tsai-chuan(b) 0.239 0.239
Dai, Tung-shiung(b) 0.307 0.307
Yang, Yu-ling(c) 0.551 0.551
Chang, Te-sheng(c) 0.551 0.551
Su, Chun-shiung(b) 0.767 0.767
Sun, Sen-yan b) 1.350 1.025
Li, Chung-sheng tc) 1.465 1.198
Li, Chih-peng c) 1.836 1.753(a)President Chen; (bPresident Lee: (C)President Chiang; (d)President Ma
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TABLE VII Details About the Six Polarized Justices
Close to +2 Close to -2
Li Li Chung- Sun Yang Dong Shih Wen-
Chih- Sheng Sen- Chien- Shiang- Sen
Peng Yan Hua Fei
Appointer Chiang Chiang Lee Chiang Lee Lee
Career Legislator Judge Judge Judge Professor Professor
Background (KMT)
Origins Main- Main- Native Main- Main- Main-
lander lander Taiwanese Lander lander lander
First First Re- First Re- First First
Appointed/ Appointed appointed Appointed appointed Appointed Appointed
Reappointed (by (by
Chiang) Chiang)
Dissent 1st 2 nd 2nd 2 nd_ I st 2nd
Ranking in (4 cases) (3 cases) (4 cases) (3 cases) (5 cases) (4 cases)
his term (5th term) (5th term) (6th term) (5th term) (6th term) (6th term)
In our dataset, there were 9 decisions with dissent in 1988-1994, part of the 5th term.
** In our dataset, there were 19 decisions with dissent in the 6th term (1994-2003).
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Figure I Example of Estimated Ideal Points (Excluding appointees of
President Ma): Justice Li Chih-peng as +2 and Justice Yang
Chien-hua as -2.
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Positions 30 to 44 refer to judges Appointed by President Chiang Ching-Kuo (KMT)
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Figure II Example of Estimated Ideal Points (Including appointees of
President Ma): Justice Li Chih-peng as +2 and Justice Yang
Chien-hua as -2.
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-4 -3 -: - 0 2 3 4
idpoints
Positions I to 5 refer to judges Appointed by President Ma Ying-jeou (KMT)
Positions 6 to 18 refer to judges Appointed by President Chen Shui-bian (DPP)
Positions 19 to 34 refer to judges Appointed by President Lee Teng-hui (KMT)
Positions 35 to 49 refer to judges Appointed by President Chiang Ching-Kuo (KMT)
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Figure III Individual Average Scoring Excluding Appointees of
President Ma
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Figure IV Individual Average Scoring Including Appointees of
President Ma
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LIST OF GRAND JUSTICES' CHINESE &
ENGLISH NAMES
As mentioned in the text, our research covers forty-nine of Grand
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APPENDIX B: THE LIST OF THE CASES
Our paper has analyzed and coded 101 decisions issued by the Grand
Justices of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court from 1988 to 2009. The

















































































The actual case number is less than 101 because some interpretations include more than one
issue, and, under these circumstances, a Justice may make plural decisions in one case.
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APPENDIX C: CODING CONTROVERSIAL CASES
All of the coded controversial cases are listed as follows. We have also
included an explanation of why some Justices' dissenting opinions have been
coded as the majority opinions in those Interpretations of the Judicial Yuan.
1) Interpretation No. 592: In this case the majority opinion favors the
petitioner, so their votes have been coded as zero (i.e. unconstitutional). As
for Shieh Tsai-chuan's dissenting, he is also favorable to the petitioner, so his
vote has been coded as zero as well. However, Tseng Yu-tien argues that this
case should be dismissed (unfavorable to the petitioner) and we have
therefore coded his vote as one.
2) Interpretation No. 585: Although it is not a unanimous decision, we
have not coded Shu Tsung-li and Shu Yu-shiu's votes as dissents after
reviewing their partial dissenting opinions.
3) Interpretation No. 553: The majority and concurring opinions have
both been coded as one. However, because Shieh Tsai-chuan's dissenting
opinion expresses that this case should be dismissed (also unfavorable to the
petitioner), we have also coded his vote as one.
4) Interpretation No. 543: In this Interpretation the majority opinions
declare that the regulations at issue do not absolutely fit in with the
Constitution and should have been reviewed by the legislators (favorable to
the petitioner), so their votes have been coded as zero. As for Dong
Shiang-fei's dissenting opinion, we coded his vote as zero as well because
the Justice clearly and strongly argues that the regulations are
unconstitutional (also favorable to the petitioner).
5) Interpretation No. 520: In this Interpretation the majority and
concurring opinions have been coded as one (unfavorable to the petitioner,
Executive Yuan). Because Chen Chi-nan presented a partially concurring
opinion, we decided to code his vote as if it were part of the majority (i.e.
one). As for the dissenting opinions of Liu Tieh-cheng, Shih Wen-sen and
Dong Shiang-fei, we also coded their votes as one because they all argue
strongly against the petitioner.
6) Interpretation No. 485: The majority opinion declares the law at issue
to be constitutional (unfavorable to the petitioners). However, Chen
Chi-nan's dissenting opinion is also unfavorable to the petitioners (he argues
that the case should be dismissed), so we have also coded his vote as one.
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7) Interpretation No. 450: We have coded the majority opinion as zero
because it favors the petitioners. As for Chen Chi-nan's dissenting opinion,
since he only disagrees with the reasoning of the majority but not their
conclusion (i.e. the holding), we have coded his vote as zero.
8) Interpretation No. 419: On issue (1)-whether the Vice President
may concurrently hold the position of the Premier of the Executive Yuan
while serving his term as Vice President-the votes of the majority have
been coded as zero (i.e. unconstitutional) for two reasons. First, unlike Liu
Tieh-cheng and Dong Shiang-fei's dissenting opinions (coded as zero), the
majority does not argue that this status is obviously unconstitutional, but
instead declares that it is constitutionally inappropriate in the end. We also
coded the majority opinion as zero because then Vice President Lien Chan
resigned his post as Premier of the Executive Yuan after this Interpretation
was released.
9) Interpretation No. 290: We have coded the majority's votes as one.
The Cheng Chien-tsai and Yang Jih-jan's alleged "dissenting" opinions were
also coded as one, since, upon a careful reading of each opinion, it becomes
evident that they are actually concurring opinions (they only disagree with
the majority's reasoning, but not the holding).
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